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I
INTRODUCTION: THE LACK OF BANKRUPTCY PROTECTIONS FOR SOVEREIGNS
The recent global financial crisis vividly displayed the legal protections
available in nonsovereign insolvencies. To use a prominent example in the
United States, the massive Chrysler Corporation—whose $49 billion in revenue
in 2007 was greater than the GDP of more than half the world’s nations1—was
able to leverage the threat of declaring bankruptcy to extract economic
concessions from its commercial lenders, bondholders, employees, and other
creditors (with significant financial and political support from the U.S.
Administration).2 Once Chrysler negotiated the terms of a sale with the
majority of its creditors, it entered bankruptcy with a prepackaged petition,
and, shortly thereafter, a new Chrysler entity emerged from the process as a
going concern, no longer burdened by billions of dollars of debt.3 Although a
minority of creditors challenged the Chrysler sale as a draconian invalidation of
their contract rights, those efforts failed under the debtor-friendly rules of
Chapter 11.4
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1. The 35 Largest U.S. Private Companies, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fortune/0805/
gallery.private_companies.fortune/4.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009); WORLD BANK, World
Development Indicators database, Gross domestic product 2007 (revised Sept. 10, 2008).
2. See Bill Vlasic & David E. Sanger, Debtholders v. U.S. Over Chrysler Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2009, at B1; Bill Vlasic, Holdouts Jeopardize Plan for Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at B1.
3. Michael J. de la Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Deal with Chrysler Seals Swift 42-Day
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at B4.
4. See In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d at 108.
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As the Chrysler case illustrates—as would other recent examples, such as
GM, Nortel, and the like—the safe harbor of insolvency law is a potent tool for
private debtors who cannot afford to pay their creditors. Even before formally
declaring bankruptcy, sophisticated parties can exploit creditor fears of judicial
contract reformation to obtain voluntary liability reduction. Once a private
company or individual enters bankruptcy, debt service and litigation against the
debtor is automatically stayed pending the completion of a mandatory
restructuring plan.5 Bankruptcy rules also allow for a post-insolvency market for
“superpriority” (debtor-in-possession) financing, which the debtor can access to
jumpstart its reorganization.
In contrast to distressed private debtors, it is axiomatic that there are no
bankruptcy protections for financially impaired sovereign states, though such a
system has been advocated for since at least the time of Adam Smith.6 When a
state cannot pay its debts, its only recourse is to enter voluntary negotiations
with its creditors, which today are a miscellany of private and public entities
with disparate agendas.7 Unlike the bankruptcy process for private debtors,
participation in a sovereign debt workout is optional, and creditors may choose
to opt out by bringing lawsuits on the face value of defaulted debt in order to
obtain judgments, and try to execute on them.
Although distressed sovereign debtors cannot use the shield of bankruptcy
law to prevent creditor litigation, rules concerning foreign sovereign immunity
have emerged as a rough, sometimes inadequate, proxy for insolvency laws.
There are two categories of sovereign-immunity protections for foreign states:
(1) immunity from suit and (2) immunity from execution. Protections
concerning immunity from suit derive from the international principle that a
sovereign should not be made to suffer the indignity of being haled into court
against its will.8 Immunity from execution provisions stem from long-standing
concerns about the disruptions and political ramifications that can result from
the seizure of a foreign state’s property.9 Under the modern, “restrictive” theory
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
6. See Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 244
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 499, 499 (2006) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 468 (Edwin
Cannan ed., Methuen and Co. 2000) (1776) (“When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself
bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both the least dishonourable to the debtor, and least
hurtful to the creditor.”)). More recently, there have been sporadic movements to create a bankruptcy
analogue for sovereigns under the auspices of an international organization such as the IMF. See, e.g.,
Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2002); International Monetary Fund, The Design of the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism—Further Considerations (Nov. 27, 2002). To date, none of these proposals
has garnered significant momentum.
7. See Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process:
Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, 1 J. RESTRUCTURING FINANCE 173 (2004).
8. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 144 (1812).
9. Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 256 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
international community viewed execution against a foreign state’s property as a greater affront to its
sovereignty than merely permitting jurisdiction over the merits of an action.”).
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of sovereign immunity—codified in some jurisdictions by national laws, such as
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in the United States—a foreign
state’s immunity is subject to various exceptions, the extent of which are often
at the heart of sovereign-litigation disputes.10 In a manner somewhat analogous
to the way bankruptcy law provides the backdrop to negotiations between an
insolvent private debtor and its creditors, the case law that has developed
interpreting the scope of foreign sovereign immunity provides the background
set of rules that inform the parties to a sovereign debt restructuring.
This article examines the progression of sovereign debt case law as
displayed by the succession of litigation strategies employed by professional
suers of defaulted sovereign states. These plaintiffs are often referred to as
“vulture funds” because their strategy is to buy sovereign debt instruments
when a country is most vulnerable, which enables the funds to purchase the
debt at a deep discount from its face value and attempt to enforce the full
claims. This business plan necessarily depends on the lack of bankruptcy
protection for sovereigns, but it is constrained by the sovereign-immunity rules
that national legislatures have enacted and national courts have elaborated to
protect the vultures’ targets from some of their attacks.
In section II of this article, we provide some historical context for the
emergence of investors specializing in speculation in sovereign debt litigation.
In section III, we examine the first phase of vulture-fund suits against foreign
sovereigns, which was dominated by litigation over the champerty defense—an
English common-law doctrine that precluded the purchase of debt with the
intent and purpose to sue upon it. In section IV, we look at the post-champerty
phase of sovereign debt litigation, when some plaintiffs advanced a novel theory
of pari passu as a “nuclear device” in their efforts to enforce judgments against
sovereigns. In section V, we come to the present phase, with an increased focus
on litigation over the “commercial activity” exception to execution immunity.
We end with some concluding thoughts on the state of sovereign debt litigation.
II
BACKGROUND OF MODERN SOVEREIGN DEBT LITIGATION: THE SECONDARY
DEBT MARKET AND ECONOMIC CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE
Modern sovereign debt litigation was born from the rise of the secondary
debt market and the attendant opportunities for arbitrage, which, in turn, gave
life to an industry of professional suers of foreign states.11 The business plan of
these entities is to purchase sovereign debt on the secondary market when it is
being traded at a discount from its face value—often significantly so—because a
10. Even under the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign state’s
completely immune from execution. However, national laws have partially lifted
immunity. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
CORPORATIONS (Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 2003).
11. See Alon Seveg, Investment: When Countries go Bust: Proposals for Debtor
Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25 (2003).
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country is so financially distressed that its debt is near or in default. The vulture
funds take advantage of the lack of bankruptcy protection for foreign states by
suing the financially distressed state and urging courts to take an expansive view
of the exceptions to sovereign immunity.12 In doing so, the vulture funds’
managers speculate that they will be able to reap profits either by obtaining
judgments and executing against nonimmune property of the state or by
extracting profitable settlements because their lawsuits may have a significant
nuisance value for the sovereign defendant.13 This strategy is possible in the first
place only because foreign states lack the bankruptcy protections available to
private debtors—if foreign states had such protections, litigation would be
automatically stayed and a tribunal would impose a mandatory “haircut” on the
creditors’ claims.
The historical event that provided the impetus for the first wave of lawsuits
by professional suers of states was the Latin American debt crisis of the early
1980s.14 Throughout the 1970s, international commercial banks were flooded
with petro-dollars from the Middle East as a result of skyrocketing oil prices.15
The banks used the influx of deposits to extend commercial loans to Latin
American countries that were hungry for capital.16 A subsequent rise in interest
rates and a global recession resulted in a string of defaults on these loans,
starting with Mexico in 1982.17 Facilitated by the United States–led Brady Plan,
distressed sovereign loans became available on the market.18 Until this event,
private sovereign debt was held primarily by large institutions, whose economic
and political interests were oriented towards achieving a voluntary workout
with the nation-debtor.19 The same was not true of market speculators, who
12. As explained by Lee Buchheit, two features of conventional financing documents used in the
United States have contributed to vulture creditor activity: (1) the conventional amendment clauses in
U.S.-style bonds and syndicated loans traditionally did not permit amendments to the payment terms of
those instruments without the consent of every holder, and (2) U.S.-style trust indentures explicitly
reserve to each individual creditor the right to sue for its share of a missed payment. See Lee C.
Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1331–32
(2002); Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinski, Grenada’s Innovations, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. &
REG. 227, 230 (2006). The development of collective-action clauses (CACs) in sovereign debt
investments beginning in 2003 has helped put a damper on some of this activity, and will do so to a
greater extent in the future, but it does not affect litigation under debt incurred at earlier periods
before CACs came into play.
13. See Jonathan C. Lippert, Note, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force a
Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1, 27 (2008).
14. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043 (2004).
15. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION (2004).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Under the Brady Plan, the U.S. government allowed commercial banks to swap loans to
distressed sovereigns for Treasury-backed bonds, and the securitized sovereign debt was in turn offered
to the public. See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2708 (1996).
19. See Samuel E. Goldman, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159 (2000).
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purchased the rights to the impaired debt at a discount, and then rejected the
voluntary restructuring process negotiated between the Latin American
governments and the vast majority of their creditors.20 These funds then brought
suit against the states to enforce the face value of the claims, plus interest.
Following the broad Latin American crisis of the 1980s, new opportunities
for vulture-creditor activity arose from debt defaults by the war-torn
Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)21 and the economic collapse in
Argentina in 2001.22 The DR Congo’s debt was primarily commercial loans
similar to the defaulted Latin American debt from the 1980s, while Argentina
had directly accessed the public markets through global bond issuances
throughout the 1990s. As these countries approached and entered default,
vulture funds once again purchased discounted claims on the secondary market
and launched a new wave of aggressive litigation campaigns.23
The market availability of their defaulted debt explains the recurring role of
Latin American and African countries as defendants in modern sovereign debt
litigation. Beginning in earnest in the mid-1990s, and actively continuing
through the present, professional plaintiffs instituted suits against these foreign
states in the United States and elsewhere. The progression of modern sovereign
debt litigation is linked to the successes and failures of the legal strategies
employed by these professional plaintiffs in obtaining judgments against the
states and trying to collect on them.

20. Id.
21. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, weak oil prices and a growing public sector combined to drive
up the DR Congo’s debt to unsustainable levels. ABDELRAHMI BESSAHA ET AL., REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: SELECTED ISSUES 12 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 07/206, June 2007), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07206.pdf. The country’s ensuing civil war exacerbated
the DR Congo’s debt burden. Id. at 14.
22. “The collapse of the Argentine economy . . . was one of the most spectacular in modern
history.” Paul Blustein, And The Money Kept Rolling In (And Out): Wall Street, The IMF, and the
Bankrupting of Argentina 1 (Public Affairs 2005). Beginning in 1998, the Argentine Republic
experienced an economic recession—later depression—which reached its nadir at the end of 2001 and
beginning of 2002. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING,
Pub. No. RL32637, at 1 (2004). Argentina was hit especially hard by a sudden halt to capital inflows
after the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian default in August 1998. Guillermo A. Calvo &
Ernesto Talvi, Sudden Stop, Financial Factors, and Economic Collapse in Latin America: Learning from
Argentina and Chile, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 119, 134–48 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008). In addition, demand from its
primary trading partner, Brazil, fell sharply after Brazil devalued its currency in 1999, and Argentina’s
exports became relatively more expensive due to a steep drop in commodity prices. Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Argentina, Short-Changed: Why the Nation that Followed the Rules Fell to Pieces, WASH. POST, May 12,
2002, at B1. Interest rate increases by the U.S. Federal Reserve, designed to slow down the United
States economy, also had a drastic impact on Argentina and its dollar-pegged currency at a time when
Argentina’s economy was contracting. Mark Weisbrot & Dean Baker, What Happened to Argentina?,
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH (Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/
argentina_2002_01_31.htm.
23. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last
Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 192–93 (2005) (discussing creditor attempts to seize Argentina’s U.S.based assets, including military assets and payments to its embassy).
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III
EARLY YEARS: THE CHAMPERTY DEFENSE
As sovereign debt litigation came to the fore in the United States following
the Latin American crisis of the 1980s, the sovereign-immunity defense from
suit was often unavailable to the sovereign defendants, either because the states
had waived such immunity in the debt contract or due to the application of the
“commercial activity” exception. Under the FSIA, waiver of immunity from suit
can either be explicit—which it often is, under transnational sovereign debt
instruments—or implicit.24 Under the statute’s “commercial activity” exception
to suit, the sovereign state’s presumption of immunity can be overcome even in
the absence of a waiver when
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
25
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.

Arguably, any activity conducted by a sovereign state is noncommercial in
some sense. But in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court
held that, when a foreign state issues “garden variety” public debt in the U.S.
market, it is engaging in commercial activity here regardless of the activity’s
purpose, and the state may thus be sued based upon that act.27 This decision
essentially foreclosed the sovereign-immunity defense to suit for countries that
had accessed the U.S. debt markets and had agreed to repayment in the United
States.28
Notwithstanding the foreign states’ lack of a sovereign-immunity defense to
suit, early lawsuits brought by professional creditor-plaintiffs were frequently
found to be both procedurally and substantively flawed, even without reference
to sovereign-immunity principles. A suit brought against Panama by a precursor
to Elliott Associates—which would become one of the most prolific litigants
24. “An express waiver under section 1605(a)(1) must give a clear, complete, unambiguous, and
unmistakable manifestation of the sovereign’s intent to waive its immunity.” See Aquamar S.A. v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “Courts
have found implied waiver where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading without raising the
defense of sovereign immunity . . . [and] where the state has agreed to arbitrate or to adopt a particular
choice of law.” World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). This exception to suit is broader than the FSIA’s commercialactivity exception to execution, which applies in the stricter circumstances when property of the foreign
state is in the United States and being “used for” a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a) (2006); see, e.g., Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 255
(“Congress used the more specific phrase ‘used for a commercial activity’ in [Section 1610] rather than
the less specific phrase ‘in connection with a commercial activity’ used in Section 1605.”).
26. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
27. Id. at 617.
28. In another significant early decision, the Second Circuit also rejected the common-law “act of
state” defense to nonpayment of sovereign debt. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522–23 (2d Cir. 1985).
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against foreign states—was dismissed based upon the fund’s failure to disclose
its principal.29 Vulture funds tend to be secretive about their investors, which is
not surprising, given the political distastefulness of seeking to reap profits at the
expense of indebted, and typically very poor, countries and their citizenry.30 Yet
knowing the identity of one’s litigation adversary is a matter of fundamental
fairness and is invariably essential to defending against claims and establishing
affirmative defenses. In Water Street, Judge Baer found the plaintiff’s steadfast
refusal to disclose its ultimate human owners to be unacceptable, and he
dismissed the case outright.31
A suit based on nonperforming Brazilian debt brought by members of the
Dart family—who would also come to figure prominently as professional
plaintiffs in sovereign debt litigation—was also short-circuited notwithstanding
the existence of U.S. jurisdiction.32 In the midst of the Latin American crisis of
the 1980s, Brazil restructured its debt with its commercial lenders pursuant to a
Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement (MYDFA). The Darts bought a
significant amount of MYDFA debt at a deep discount on the secondary
market—so much so that they became one of Brazil’s largest foreign creditors.33
When Brazil later sought to restructure its MYDFA debt under the Brady Plan,
the Darts held out and brought suit in the Southern District of New York. The
district court held, however, that the plaintiffs could not accelerate principal
under the MYDFA’s contractual terms, which required at least fifty percent of
the creditors to vote for acceleration.34
The most potent defense asserted by foreign states in these early cases was
champerty. Had the courts broadly accepted this defense asserted by foreign
29. Water Street Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Republic of Panama, No. 94 Civ. 2609 (HB), 1995 WL
51160 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1995).
30. See, e.g., Gordon Brown, The Chancellor of the Exchequer and IMF Governor for the U.K.,
Financing A World Fit For Children, Speech at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session
on Children (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./newsroom_and_speeches/
press/2002/press_46_02.cfm (“We particularly condemn the perversity where Vulture Funds purchase
debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount
owed—a morally outrageous outcome.”); John B. Taylor, Under Secretary Of Treasury For
International Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Conference
on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes And Hazards? (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/po2056.htm.
31. Water Street Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Republic of Panama, 1995 WL 51160, at *1; See Elliott
Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 82, 86–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing discovery of the
principals and management of plaintiff).
32. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman), Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
33. See Agasha Mugasha, Solutions for Developing-Country External Debt: Insolvency or
Forgiveness?, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 89 (2007).
34. The plaintiff had alleged that Brazilian officials had ordered Banco do Brasil, S.A., to hold an
amount of MYDFA debt greater than the Darts’ share, specifically to prevent the family from
accelerating the principal. Another nonjurisdictional issue raised in some of the earlier cases was the
court’s discretion to stay suits against a financially distressed sovereign to permit consensual debt
restructuring to take place. Such stays would not be permitted to last indefinitely, but courts would
retain the ability to impose them for appropriate periods. Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular
Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 855 (2d Cir. 1997).
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state-defendants, it could effectively have ended the industry of speculating in
sovereign debt litigation. Champerty, originated in English common law and
later adopted by state legislatures, forbids as an abuse of process the purchase
of debt with the intent, and for the purpose of, bringing a lawsuit.35 The defense
had a natural application to the claims brought by vulture funds against foreign
states since the funds’ strategy necessarily anticipated litigation following the
purchase of nonperforming debt.
In Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru,36 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that champerty barred claims brought
by Elliott Associates on nonperforming debt of the Republic of Peru.37 The
district court allowed Peru to conduct discovery of Elliott in connection with its
champerty defense, and the court’s opinion detailed the facts surrounding the
formation of Elliott’s sovereign debt litigation strategy, which it found ran afoul
of the champerty rule.38 But in a game-changing decision, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court,39 holding that if the suer’s intent in purchasing the
discounted debt was to be paid in full or otherwise to sue, such intent did not
meet champerty’s intent requirement. The Court of Appeals found Elliott’s
intent to sue on the debt was “contingent” even though “Elliott knew Peru
would not, under the circumstances, pay in full.”40 The Second Circuit’s narrow
reading of the champerty defense was accepted by other courts, as by the D.C.
District Court in Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia,41 and saved the business of
speculating in defaulted sovereign debt from what would otherwise have been a
major setback.
Despite the Second Circuit’s ruling in Elliott Associates, some residual
uncertainty remained concerning the application of the champerty defense in
New York state courts.42 Not willing to leave the fate of its business model to
judicial chance, vulture funds apparently lobbied the New York state legislature
to amend the law by statute.43 And on August 17, 2004, the New York state
legislature amended N.Y. Judiciary Law 489 to effectively eliminate the defense
of champerty as to any debt purchases or assignments having a value of more
than $500,000.
35. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business
Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486–89 (1992).
36. 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
37. Elliott had rejected Peru’s Brady exchange offer, which closed in March 1997, and was
achieved based on Peru’s verbal promise not to provide any extra benefits to holdout creditors. Sönke
Häseler, Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds (German Working Papers in
L. & Econ., Paper No. 17, 2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art17.
38. 12 F. Supp. 2d at 333–35; but see Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp.
332 (S.D.N.Y 1997); Banque de Gestion Privee-SIB v. Republica de Paraguay, 787 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
39. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 379.
41. 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002).
42. See, e.g., Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 94 N.Y.S.2d 726, 736 (N.Y. 2000).
43. See Memorandum in Support, New York State Assembly, Bill Number: A7244C.
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IV
SECOND PHASE: PARI PASSU
With the defeat of the champerty defense, the path was clear for litigants to
purchase defaulted sovereign debt, to reject the sovereign’s voluntary
restructuring process, and to obtain judgments at the obligation’s face value.
The paper judgments were just that, however, and plaintiffs still faced a high
hurdle in executing on foreign state property. The focus of sovereign debt
litigation thus quickly turned to judgment enforcement against the debtor
states.
Judgment creditors apparently recognized from the outset that scanning the
globe for nonimmune, executable property of a foreign state could prove to be
an expensive and fruitless exercise. As an alternate to this pursuit, vulture funds
invented what they believed could be a devastating enforcement device—an
expansive application of the pari passu clause contained in many sovereign debt
instruments.44 The pari passu provision is a standard clause in cross-border
lending agreements that contains a borrower’s promise to ensure that the
obligation will always rank equally in right of payment with all of the
borrower’s other unsubordinated debts.45 The international financial markets
long understood the clause to protect a lender against the risk of legal
subordination in favor of another similarly situated creditor.46
In 2000, Elliott sought to enforce its judgment against Peru—the same
judgment that the Second Circuit had held was not precluded by champerty—
by advancing a novel interpretation of the pari passu clause. Elliott argued that
not only was Peru barred from legally subordinating its loan debt under the
agreement’s pari passu clause, but the same provision precluded Peru from
paying other creditors (such as holders of restructured debt) without also
paying it pro rata as a judgment creditor on the defaulted contract. Elliott
succeeded ex parte on this argument in the Brussels Court of Appeals in
Belgium and blocked a payment that Peru was to make to the holders of its

44. See generally Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2003).
45. “In a loan agreement, the pari passu clause is often drafted as follows: ‘The payment
obligations of the borrower under this Agreement rank at least pari passu with all its other present and
future unsecured obligations.’ In an international securities issue, the pari passu clause is usually found
in the ‘status’ or ‘ranking’ condition and is often drafted as follows: ‘The bonds and the coupons are
direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the issuer and rank and will rank at least pari passu,
without any preference among themselves, with all other outstanding, unsecured and unsubordinated
obligations of the issuer, present and future.’” Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 79—Pari Passu
Clauses (Mar. 2005).
46. Modern commercial bank loans and bonds for purely domestic lending to corporate borrowers
do not usually contain any form of pari passu representation or covenant. See Buchheit & Pam, supra
note 44. Presumably, this reflects the lenders’ confidence that U.S. law (1) does not permit an
involuntary subordination of an existing creditor and (2) calls for a ratable payout in bankruptcy of all
similarly-situated creditors within each class to the extent of available assets. Id.
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restructured debt via Euroclear47 on the theory that it violated the pari passu
provision in Peru’s defaulted debt.48 Peru quickly settled with Elliott, which
realized a significant return on its original investment.
Not surprisingly, Elliott and others were encouraged by the result against
Peru in Belgium and brought other enforcement actions based on the same pari
passu theory. In Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of Congo,49 a
U.S. district court in California appeared to reject the pari passu theory as such,
but, for unexplained reasons, nonetheless enjoined the DR Congo from making
any payments on its “External Indebtedness” (as defined in the credit
agreement) without making a proportionate payment to Red Mountain.50 Like
Peru, the DR Congo ultimately settled the case. In LNC Investments v.
Nicaragua,51 plaintiffs once again asserted this theory in Belgium and obtained
an ex parte order blocking Nicaragua’s payment on certain bonds that were to
be made by Euroclear. Unlike Peru and DR Congo, though, Nicaragua
appealed.
The tide began to turn against Elliott’s pari passu strategy in Kensington
International Ltd. v. Republic of Congo.52 In Kensington, an affiliate controlled
by Elliott sought the same result in London that Elliott had achieved in
Belgium. But the English court denied Kensington’s attempt to restrain the
Congo from paying its other creditors without paying it pro rata based on
Elliott’s pari passu theory.53 The English trial judge recognized the claim as
“novel” and “unprecedented,” although he ultimately denied—and the
appellate court affirmed—the injunction attempt on equitable grounds,
including the plaintiff’s failure to identify who it was or how much it had paid
for its debt.
Elliott’s pari passu strategy was dealt another severe blow when the Brussels
Court of Appeals, this time with the benefit of an adversary presentation,
reversed course in LNC Investments v. Nicaragua and held that, irrespective of
the construction of the contractual pari passu clause, that clause could not be
invoked against Euroclear (the settlement agent under Nicaragua’s indemnity
bonds) since Euroclear was not a party to the contract under which the pari

47. Euroclear is a financial intermediary based in Brussels, which settles domestic and
international securities transactions. See https://www.euroclear.com/site/public/EB.
48. See Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR192. 12 (Ct. App. of Brussels, 8th
Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (“It also appears from the basic agreement that governs the repayment of the
foreign debt of Peru that the various creditors benefit from a pari passu clause that in effect provides
that the debt must be repaid pro rata among all creditors. This seems to lead to the conclusion that,
upon an interest payment, no creditor can be deprived of its proportionate share.”).
49. Case No. CV 00-0164 R, 2000 WL 34479543 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2000). The case was heard by
Judge Real, one of the most often reversed judges in the Ninth Circuit. See Carol J. Williams, Critics
Want to Bench Judge Manuel L. Real, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009.
50. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 44, at 881.
51. Commercial Court of Brussels, Sept. 11, 2003.
52. [2003] EWHC (Comm) (Eng.).
53. See id.
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passu clause arose.54 By this time, Belgian legislators had also taken notice that
Elliott’s pari passu campaign, and the Belgian courts’ unpredictability on the
issue, might undermine Belgium’s place in the world financial markets. The
Belgian Parliament thus instituted a law shielding Euroclear from injunctions.55
In the District Court for the Southern District of New York, Elliott and
other creditors suggested that they might pursue the pari passu theory in their
lawsuits against Argentina pending before that court. Both the United States
government and the Clearing House Association of New York Banks filed
amici statements opposing Elliott’s pari passu interpretation, but the New York
federal court ultimately declined to address the issue, ruling that the case was
not ripe for review.56 Perhaps in light of these statements, nothing further has
been heard of the pari passu argument in more recent court proceedings.57
For whatever reason, the Elliott pari passu strategy seems to have receded
from the forefront of creditor enforcement strategies. Managers of vulture
funds may have sensed that the political and legal climates were aligning
towards a conclusive defeat of the theory. Without the ability to freeze the
debtor–foreign state’s payments to other creditors via pari passu, plaintiffs were
forced to concentrate on trying to directly execute against foreign state
property, which has animated the current phase of sovereign debt litigation.
V
CURRENT PHASE: EXECUTION LITIGATION
Limits on execution against a foreign state’s property, however, present a
significant obstacle for litigants that hold judgments against foreign states. The
exception to execution immunity that professional litigants against foreign
states have most frequently raised is the “commercial activity” exception.
Under the FSIA, this exception provides that a creditor may execute against a
foreign state’s property to the extent that the property is in the United States
and “used for” a commercial activity in the United States.58
Early cases interpreting the commercial-activity exception to execution
immunity focused on whether the nature of property was such as inherently to
make its use the support and maintenance of governmental functions of the
sovereign. To the extent that a foreign state’s property was for the benefit of the
government’s sovereign activities, courts found the commercial-activity

54. Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Invs. & Euroclear Bank, S.A., No. 2003/KR/334 (Court of
Appeals of Brussels, 9th Chamber, Mar. 19, 2004).
55. See Belgian Law 1119201, art. 15.
56. Transcript of Conference Before Judge Thomas P. Griesa, at 9, Applestein v. Republic of
Argentina and Province of Buenos Aires, No. 02 CV-1773 (TPG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14083
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2004).
57. Very recently, for the first time since 2004, pari passu has reared its head again in a new
attempt by Elliott to argue that an Argentine law enacted in 2005 to regulate exchange offers for
defaulted debt violated the pari passu clause. How this effort will fare remains to be seen.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006).
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exception inapplicable. In LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua,59 a
vulture creditor sought an attachment in New York of taxes collected and paid
by American and Continental Airlines to Nicaragua. The court held that
because taxation is a uniquely governmental activity in which private persons
cannot and do not engage, the tax obligations were noncommercial property
and thus immune under Section 1610(a).60
A milestone in execution litigation against sovereigns that refined the
approach to the commercial-activity exception to execution immunity was the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of
Congo.61 The Fifth Circuit placed particular emphasis on the statutory phrase
“used for” under Section 1610(a) of the FSIA, which provides that a foreign
state’s property must be “used for” a commercial activity in the United States in
order to be subject to execution. By inserting the phrase “used for,” the Fifth
Circuit said Congress had made clear its intent that “[w]hat matters under the
statute is not how [the foreign state] made its money, but how it spends it.”62
The Fifth Circuit thus held that the relevant inquiry concerning the tax and
royalty obligations at issue was not only the property’s nature, but also whether
and how the assets had been “used” by the state.63 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
centrality of the “use” analysis in Walker International Holdings Ltd. v.
Republic of Congo, when it held that purported property of the Congo could
not be attached when there was no evidence of how the property had been
“used,” let alone any evidence that it had been used for a commercial activity in
the United States.64 The Second and Ninth Circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s
lead, which confirmed that the “used for” commercial-activity exception was a
narrow one.65

59. No. 96 Civ. 6360 (JFK), 2000 WL 745550 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000).
60. See Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 77–78 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (denying attachment of tax obligations because “[t]he levy and collection of taxes intended to
serve as revenues for the support and maintenance of governmental functions are an exercise of powers
particular to a sovereign”).
61. 309 F.3d 240.
62. Id. at 253.
63. Id. at 256–58.
64. 395 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2004) (“While these funds could indeed be used for other
commercial purposes, such as debt service, Walker does not make this assertion.”) (citation omitted).
65. See EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 481 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 109 (2007); Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo), Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[P]roperty is ‘used for a commercial activity in the United States’ when the property in question is put
into action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial activity, not in connection with a
commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.”) (emphasis in original); Ministry of Def. &
Support for the Armed Servs. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 495 F.3d 1024,
1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because repatriation into a ministry’s budget does not constitute commercial
activity, we hold that the . . . [property] is not subject to attachment under § 1610(a).”); Colella v.
Republic of Argentina, No. C 07-80084 (WHA), 2007 WL 1545204, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007)
(noting that the Argentine equivalent of Air Force One was only “used for” transporting the President
of Argentina, and that “[s]ervice and maintenance do not convert the airplane into an implement used
in commerce any more than filling its tanks with jet fuel would be considered a commercial use”).
Other litigation under §1610 has focused on the requirement that the foreign state’s property be used
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Not only are judgment creditors faced with a narrow exception to immunity
for the foreign state’s property under these decisions, but also, in any event,
insolvent sovereign debtors rarely have even arguably attachable assets in
jurisdictions where execution is possible. Judgment creditors have thus, more
recently, turned their sights to property of agencies or instrumentalities of the
state—which may be more likely than the state itself to maintain assets outside
of their home jurisdiction—and have argued that the property of those entities
should be available to satisfy judgments of the state. Plaintiffs must nonetheless
grapple with the Supreme Court’s decision in First National City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), which held that agencies or
instrumentalities of a state are entitled to a presumption of legal status
independent from that of the state itself.66 To overcome that presumption,
plaintiffs must sue the entity, serve it, obtain jurisdiction over it under the
FSIA, and meet the exacting standards of Bancec and its progeny for
disregarding its separate status. And when attempting to reach property held by
a foreign state’s central bank, creditors face an even higher bar because central
banks are afforded heightened protections under the FSIA.67
Some judgment creditors have made creative arguments in attempting to
evade Bancec’s application—for instance, by arguing that the foreign state had a
direct ownership interest in the property held by the agency or instrumentality.
But such efforts have mostly failed. In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,68
entities controlled by Elliott and the Dart family sought to block a payment by
Argentina’s central bank to the IMF and attach reserves held by the bank at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The funds argued that because Argentina
had authorized its central bank to pay back the IMF on its behalf, Argentina
acquired a property interest in the central bank’s reserves. The Second Circuit
disagreed and held that it saw
no reason why the presumption of separateness required by Bancec . . . should not
apply here to shield the [reserves] from attachment. . . . We reject plaintiffs’ effort to
circumvent Bancec . . . by characterizing [Argentina’s] ability and willingness to
control BCRA as a transfer of property rights sufficient to give the Republic an
69
attachable interest in [the central bank’s reserves.]

The court further recognized that funds used to repay the IMF were not
“used for a commercial activity” since only sovereigns can borrow from the IMF
and pay it back, and the targeted funds at issue had not in any event been used

“in the United States.” See Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (a foreign
state’s interest was located in the United States because the garnishee was located here), but see FG
Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. République du Congo, 455 F.3d 575, 589–90 (5th Cir. 2006) (the interest at
issue in Af-Cap was not in the United States when the garnishee was no longer located here).
66. 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, 115 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362–63
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., LNC Invs., Inc. v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir.
2000).
68. 473 F.3d 463.
69. Id. at 479.
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for Argentina’s repayment.70 And, although it did not need to reach the issue,
the Second Circuit also noted the heightened protections given to central-bank
funds under the FSIA.71
Most recently, various vultures—led by Aurelius Capital Partners, LP
(Aurelius), a recent fund created by former Elliott portfolio managers—sought
to execute on social security funds of Argentine citizens that had been invested
in New York by private pension fund managers.72 In December 2008, the
Argentine Congress enacted legislation to restructure the hybrid public–private
Argentine national social-security system by returning it to a single, unified
system under the management of Argentina’s public social-security
administration. The district court granted motions for execution on the socialsecurity funds managed by the private managers in New York based on the
plaintiffs’ premise that the new Argentine legislation made these funds
attachable property of the state because the Argentine law transferred
responsibility for administering them to Argentina’s public social security
agency. The Second Circuit reversed and vacated the orders because the funds
had not been used by the state for a commercial activity in the United States.73 In
this context, the Court of Appeals concluded,
As we read ‘used for a commercial activity,’ we hold that a sovereign’s mere transfer
to a governmental entity of legal control over an asset does not qualify the property as
being ‘used for a commercial activity.’ A contrary conclusion would essentially nullify
the Act’s commercial activity requirement in cases involving attachment and
74
execution of a foreign state’s property.

On the heels of the Second Circuit’s rejection of its attempt to execute
against Argentine social security funds in the United States, Aurelius then tried
to execute against Argentine social security funds maintained in custodial
accounts in Argentina.75 The district court rejected this second execution
attempt under the FSIA because the purported foreign state property was
neither “in the United States” nor “used for a commercial activity in the United
70. See id. at 481–85.
71. Id. at 485–86 (citing LNC Invs., 115 F. Supp. 2d 358). In EM, supra note 68, the Second Circuit
noted that plaintiffs had purposely declined to argue that the central bank was the alter ego of the state
proper under the standards set forth by Bancec. Id. at 480–81. Nevertheless, while the appeal was
pending, the same plaintiffs filed a new alter ego action against Argentina and its central bank and
simultaneously sought to attach the same funds at issue in EM based upon the alter ego theory. The
district court recently granted plaintiffs’ alter ego application, and the appeal of that decision is now
pending. EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2010 WL 1404119 (S.D.N.Y.
April 7, 2010), appeal docketed, 10-1487 (CON) (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2010).
72. Aurelius Capital Partners, L.P. v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2009), cert
denied 130 S. Ct. 1691 (2010).
73. Id. at 131 (“[B]efore the retirement and pension funds at issue could be subject to attachment,
the funds in the hands of the Republic must have been ‘used for a commercial activity.’”) (emphasis in
original).
74. Id. Based on this finding under Section 1610(a), the Second Circuit concluded that it need not
address whether the funds were also immune from attachment because they were to be managed under
the new law by a presumptively separate agency or instrumentality of Argentina.
75. See Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, No. 07 Civ. 2715 (TPG), 2010 WL
768874 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010).

BLACKMAN & MUKHI

Fall 2010]

1/16/2011

EVOLUTION OF MODERN SOVEREIGN DEBT LITIGATION

61

States.”76 In vacating the district court’s stay pending appeal, the Second Circuit
also held that plaintiffs were unlikely to “succeed on the merits of a claim that
the custodial accounts at issue are being used for a commercial activity in the
United States,” and plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their appeal of the district
court’s ruling.77
VI
CONCLUSION
The case law interpreting the scope of sovereign immunity has often
developed in response to the various litigation paths that professional plaintiffs
have undertaken. In effect, sovereign debt litigation has begun to resemble a
chess match: a move by a vulture is blocked or countered, and a new move or
theory comes into vogue as another avenue to try to increase the chances of
recovery. Unfortunately, for the state defendant, this is not a game; the
vulture’s portfolio may be diversified, and it may believe that it only needs an
occasional big win to recoup its costs of carry-and-litigation expense. For the
state however, what is at issue is not a litigation gamble, but the economic and
social welfare of its citizens. Eventually, something other than litigation may be
the answer to sovereign debt defaults. But until that day comes, if it ever does,
judicial decisions of the kind described in this article will provide the framework
for how states and their creditors attempt to deal with these problems.

76. Id. at *4.
77. Motion Order, Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 10-837-cv (CON) (2d
Cir. Mar. 24, 2010), appeal withdrawn, Apr. 9, 2010.

